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Abstract In their ‘Metaethical contextualism defended’ (Ethics, 2010) Gunnar Björnsson 
& Stephen Finlay argue that metaethical contextualism - roughly, the view that 'ought' 
claims are semantically incomplete and require supplementation by certain parameters 
provided by the context in which they are uttered - can deal with two influential 
problems.  The first concerns the connection between deliberation and advice (the 
'practical integration problem').  The second concerns the way in which the expression 
‘ought’ behaves in intra- and inter-contextual disagreement reports (the 'semantic 
assessment problem').  I argue that, while Björnsson & Finlay can deal with the first 
problem, they can’t deal with the second.    
0. Introductory remarks 
Gunnar Björnsson & Stephen Finlay (2010) defend a version of metaethical contextualism, 
on which a sentence of the form ‘S ought to ø’ expresses the proposition that a subject S 
ought, relative to some body of information i and standard m, to ø, where i and m are 
provided by the context.1  Metaethical contextualism is motivated in part by the need to 
give a uniform semantic analysis of both the ‘objective ought’ (what one ought to do 
given the facts) and the (many) ‘subjective oughts’ (what one ought to do given some 
body of information).  However, as Björnsson & Finlay note, their view faces two 
objections.  First, the view disconnects deliberation and advice (pp. 11-12).  Following 
Björnsson & Finlay, call this the practical integration problem.  Second, the view can’t explain 
certain patterns of linguistic data (pp. 17-25).  For instance: 
AGENT: Agent needs to rescue a missing child.  She knows that the child is down one of 
two wells - call them well A and well B - but, unfortunately, she doesn’t know which. 
Agent has good but not conclusive evidence that the child is in well A.  Agent says ‘I 
                                                 
1 Three things: First, unless otherwise stated all references are to Björnsson & Finlay 
(2010).  Second, following Björnsson & Finlay I remain neutral about what the relevant 
body of information is (p. 10; pp. 12-13).  Third, I set aside standard-relativity and focus 
on information-relativity.  The problems I raise for information-relativity will have 
analogs for standard-relativity. 
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ought to go to well A’.  Now imagine that Advisor, who is monitoring Agent’s activities 
on CCTV, has excellent (better than Agent’s) but still not conclusive evidence that the 
child is in well B.  Advisor says ‘No, Agent’s wrong.  She ought to go to well B’.2   
AGENT raises two problems.  First, it looks like Advisor disagrees with Agent.  But, if the 
metaethical contextualist is right, what Advisor said doesn’t contradict what Agent said 
(it may well be that, relative to Agent’s information, Agent ought to go to well A while, 
relative to Advisor’s, Agent ought to go to well B).  So what do they disagree about? 
Second, if Agent and Advisor don’t disagree about anything, how does the metaethical 
contextualist explain Advisor’s use of the ‘disagreement markers’ ‘No’ and ‘Agent’s 
wrong’? While Björnsson & Finlay lump both problems together under the label ‘the 
semantic assessment problem’ I’ll occasionally keep them apart (I explain why below). 
My thesis is that, while Björnsson & Finlay deal with the practical integration problem, 
they can’t deal with the semantic assessment problem.  I start by, first, motivating two 
desiderata for a solution to the semantic assessment problem (§1) and, second, sketching 
Björnsson & Finlay’s solution (§2).  I then argue that, insofar as their solution satisfies 
the second desideratum, it fails to satisfy the first.  Consequently, their solution fails (§3).  
I finish by drawing a moral from my discussion (§4). 
1. Two desiderata 
For the metaethical contextualist the ‘ought’ of deliberation is relativised to the 
information at the deliberator’s disposal whereas the ‘ought’ of advice is relativised to the 
information at the advisor’s disposal.  The intuitive idea behind the practical integration 
problem is that - as in AGENT - the two bodies of information may differ.  Consequently, 
the two oughts don’t ‘mesh’.  In rough outline, Björnsson & Finlay’s response is to argue 
that deliberation and advice are connected via a common concern with ensuring that 
decisions are made based on the best possible information, rather than via a common 
body of information (pp. 11-17).3  Advisor and Agent are concerned with ensuring that 
Agent acts on the best possible information, and Advisor’s ‘ought’ claim is made relative 
                                                 
2 This simplified variant on the case Björnsson & Finlay discuss will serve my purposes in 
this paper. 
3 Björnsson & Finlay say that deliberation and advice are connected via a common end 
(in AGENT, rescuing the missing child) and Agent and Advisor have a common concern 
(with ensuring that Agent acts on the basis of the best information) because that would 
put Agent in a better position to attain that end (pp. 15-16).  This simplification doesn’t 
affect the argument of §3. 
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to the best possible information.  Consequently, Advisor’s ‘ought’ claim addresses 
Agent’s concern. 
This deals with the practical integration problem, but it leaves the semantic assessment 
problem untouched.  Advisor may address Agent’s concern, but why does Advisor seem 
to disagree with Agent, and why is Advisor’s use of the disagreement markers ‘No’ and 
‘Agent’s wrong’ felicitous?  In what follows I motivate two desiderata for a solution to 
the semantic assessment problem. 
First, Advisor uses the disagreement markers ‘No’ and ‘Agent’s wrong’.  But there are 
other disagreement markers that Advisor could have used, for instance: 
(1) Advisor: What Agent said/thinks/believes - that she ought to go to well A - is false.  
She ought to go to well B. 
A solution to the semantic assessment problem has to deal with the full range of 
disagreement markers, not just ‘No’ and ‘Agent’s wrong’.  This is the first desideratum, 
which I’ll call RESPECT THE DATA.4   
Second, a natural assumption is that disagreement and semantic assessment always 
concerns the proposition literally asserted (so, in particular, disagreement about and 
semantic assessment of ‘ought’ claims always concerns the proposition literally asserted).  
But, as Björnsson & Finlay argue, the assumption is implausible (pp. 19-20).  For 
instance: 
(2) Fred: I was told that Barney stole the money. 
Wilma: No, you’re wrong.  Barney didn’t steal the money. 
If the assumption were right then the natural interpretation of (2) would be that Wilma 
disagrees with Fred about whether Fred was told that Barney stole the money, and she is 
expressing that disagreement via the disagreement markers ‘No’ and ‘You’re wrong’.  But 
that’s implausible.  Rather, Wilma disagrees with Fred about whether Barney stole the 
money, and she is expressing that disagreement via the disagreement markers ‘No’ and 
‘You’re wrong’.  Cases like (2) suggest that disagreement and semantic assessment always 
concern the most salient proposition, where the most salient proposition depends on a 
range of contextual factors (conversational interests and the like).  Because Fred and 
Wilma are primarily concerned with who stole the money, the proposition that Barney 
                                                 
4 Crucially (for my argument) Björnsson & Finlay accept the first desideratum (p. 19). 
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stole the money is most salient.  Wilma disagrees with Fred about whether Barney stole 
the money, and she expresses that via the disagreement markers ‘No’ and ‘You’re wrong’.  
However, even the suggested modification isn’t right.  For instance:   
(3) Frank: I love haggis.   
Stephen: No way! Haggis is disgusting. 
On the modified assumption, Stephen and Frank don’t disagree (Stephen may accept 
that Frank loves haggis).  But Stephen’s rejoinder seems perfectly in order, which 
suggests that they do disagree.  To make sense of that one can distinguish different 
‘senses’ of disagreement, one of which involves incompatibility in non-doxastic attitudes. 
Frank loves haggis whereas Stephen hates it, and Stephen couldn’t coherently adopt 
Frank’s attitude without thereby abandoning his own (and vice versa).  Note that 
disagreement in this sense licenses the use of certain disagreement markers (‘No way!’, 
perhaps ‘You’re wrong’) but it certainly doesn’t license the use of the full range of 
disagreement markers.  For instance: 
(4) Stephen: What you said/think/believe is false.  Haggis is disgusting. 
In contrast with his rejoinder in (3), Stephen’s rejoinder in (4) is bizarre.  The moral is 
that different senses of disagreement license the use of different ranges of disagreement 
markers.  This will be important in what follows, and it explains why I’m keeping the two 
parts of the semantic assessment problem apart.  A candidate explanation of what 
disagreement about a certain class of claims concerns might not explain the use of the 
required range of disagreement markers.   
Just as the interpretation of (2) and (3) identified the sense of disagreement in play, and 
then appealed to that sense in explaining the use of certain disagreement markers, a 
solution to the semantic assessment problem has to identify the sense of disagreement in 
play in AGENT, and then appeal to that sense in explaining the use of various 
disagreement markers.  This is the second desideratum, which I’ll call LOCATE 
DISAGREEMENT. 
2. The solution 
In this section I sketch Björnsson & Finlay’s solution to the semantic assessment 
problem.  The sketch draws on an analogy with (2).  Just as Wilma assesses something 
other than the proposition Fred literally asserted and their disagreement is about 
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something other than that proposition, Björnsson & Finlay hold that Advisor assesses 
something other than the proposition Agent literally asserted and that their disagreement 
is about something other than that proposition.  I’ll take what Advisor assesses first, and 
what Agent and Advisor disagree about second. 
Recall that, as Björnsson & Finlay argue, the fundamental concern motivating our 
assessments of ‘ought’ claims is with ensuring that decisions are made on the basis of the 
best information.  Consequently, concern with the truth or falsity of particular ‘ought’ 
claims is always derivative.  In any context, one’s best guess as to the thing to do is just 
going to be whatever ‘ought’ claim is true in one’s context.  But any ‘ought’ claim is 
conversationally relevant only insofar as it’s the best guess as to the thing to do.  Once 
new information becomes available, ‘ought’ claims based on older information become 
conversationally irrelevant.   
Applying this to AGENT, both Agent and Advisor are concerned with ensuring that 
Agent acts on the best information.  But Advisor has better information than Agent, 
which means that the truth or falsity of Agent’s ‘ought’ claim is irrelevant.  Consequently, 
the proposition that Agent ought, relative to Advisor’s information, to go to well A is the 
salient proposition for semantic assessment.  The idea is that the ‘target’ of semantic 
assessment shifts with the context.  Advisor targets the claim that Agent ought, relative 
to Advisor’s information, to go to well A rather than the claim that Agent ought, relative 
to Agent’s information, to go to well A.  I’ll call this the shifting target view of semantic 
assessment, and I’ll refer to the target of semantic assessment as the ‘target content’. 
Still, one might wonder why Advisor responds to Agent’s claim by ‘saying ‘No, Agent’s 
wrong’ rather than as follows (p. 19): 
(5) Advisor: That’s nice.  But Agent ought to go to well B.  
On Björnsson & Finlay’s view, ‘ought’ claims function pragmatically as recommendations, 
the idea being that ‘ought’ claims recommend courses of action.  So, in saying that she 
‘ought’ to go to well A Agent recommends that she go to well A but, because Advisor 
recommends that Agent go to well B, they disagree about whether to recommend Agent 
going to well A.  As Björnsson & Finlay put it (p. 22), this is a sort of quasi-expressivism 
(‘expressivism’ because recommendations are non-doxastic attitudes; ‘quasi’ because this 
is part of the pragmatics, not semantics, of ‘ought’ claims).  
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Putting the pieces together, Björnsson & Finlay defend the shifting target view, on which 
the target of semantic assessment shifts with the context, and a sort of quasi-
expressivism, on which disagreement about ‘ought’ claims involves a sort of non-
doxastic attitude.  The upshot is that Advisor semantically assesses the proposition Agent 
would have asserted if she had made her utterance in Advisor’s context (rather than the 
proposition Agent literally asserted) and Advisor and Agent disagree about whether to 
recommend Agent going to well A. 
3. Why the solution fails 
In this section I’ll argue that, insofar as Björnsson & Finlay’s solution satisfies LOCATE 
DISAGREEMENT (the second desideratum) it fails to satisfy RESPECT THE DATA (the first). 
Consequently, their solution fails. 
As a preliminary, compare AGENT and (2): 
(2) Fred: I was told that Barney stole the money. 
Wilma: No, you’re wrong.  Barney didn’t steal the money. 
Again, Fred and Wilma disagree about whether Barney stole the money, and the 
proposition that Barney stole the money is the target of semantic assessment.  So the 
target content here is the proposition that Barney stole the money, Fred and Wilma 
disagree about whether that proposition is true, and Wilma expresses that via her use of 
the disagreement markers ‘No’ and ‘You’re wrong’.  In contrast, in AGENT the target 
content is the proposition that Agent ought, relative to Advisor’s information, to go to 
well A, but Advisor and Agent disagree about whether to recommend Agent going to 
well A, not about the target content.  So in (2) disagreement concerns the target content 
whereas in AGENT disagreement concerns something other than the target content. 
I’m going to raise three problems.  The first two are relatively minor, and I’ll suggest how 
Björnsson & Finlay could deal with them.  However, the third is far deeper.  I’ll canvass a 
possible response on Björnsson & Finlay’s behalf, but I’ll explain why I don’t think it 
helps. 
First, isn’t (2) meant to give us a handle on the sort of phenomenon that Björnsson & 
Finlay appeal to in order to solve the semantic assessment problem? Just as we can make 
sense of Fred and Wilma’s disagreement in (2), we can make sense of Agent and 
Advisor’s disagreement in AGENT.  But, as I’ve just argued, (2) and AGENT are 
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disanalogous in certain respects.  So it’s unclear that (2) gives us a handle on the relevant 
phenomenon.   
Response: Given the obvious disanalogies between (2) and AGENT - for instance, it’s 
plausible that Fred saying that he was told that Barney stole the money pragmatically 
conveys that Barney stole the money whereas it’s not plausible that Agent’s ‘ought’ claim 
pragmatically conveys that Agent ought, relative to Advisor’s information, to go to well 
A - it would be somewhat surprising if Björnsson & Finlay’s argument rested on an 
analogy.  But, charitably interpreted, the only role (2) need play in their argument is to 
provide support for their view that semantic assessment need not concern the 
proposition literally asserted.   
Second, one might think that the disanalogy is crucial.  Fred and Wilma disagree about 
the same thing that Wilma semantically assesses, whereas Agent and Advisor’s disagree 
about something other than the thing that Advisor semantically assesses.  But one might 
worry that it’s at least not obvious that disagreement and semantic assessment can be 
disconnected in this way. 
Response: This looks much like the practical integration problem, and the same response 
is available.  Just as deliberation and advice are integrated via a common concern (with 
acting on the basis of the best information), semantic assessment and disagreement are 
integrated (or connected) via the same common concern.  I see no reason why this 
response is any less plausible than the response to the practical integration problem. 
Third, and more importantly, in order to satisfy LOCATE DISAGREEMENT a solution to 
the semantic assessment problem has to identify the sense of disagreement in play in 
AGENT.  On Björnsson & Finlay’s quasi-expressivism the relevant sense is a sort of 
incompatibility in non-doxastic attitude.  Again: Agent recommends that she go to well A 
whereas Advisor recommends that Agent go to well B, and Agent could not coherently 
adopt Advisor’s attitude without thereby abandoning her own (and vice versa).  Now 
recall that in order to satisfy RESPECT THE DATA a solution has to explain why Advisor 
can felicitously express her disagreement with Agent not just via disagreement markers 
such as ‘No’ and ‘Agent’s wrong’ but also via disagreement markers such as ‘What Agent 
said/thinks/believes is false’.  But, as we’ve already seen, incompatibility in non-doxastic 
attitude licenses the use of some disagreement markers (‘No’, ‘You’re wrong’) but not 
others, in particular ‘What you said/think/believe is false’.  So Björnsson & Finlay’s 
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quasi-expressivism doesn’t license the use of the required range of disagreement markers.  
In short, insofar as Björnsson & Finlay satisfy LOCATE DISAGREEMENT, they fail to 
satisfy RESPECT THE DATA.  But, as I’ve argued, a solution to the semantic assessment 
problem has to satisfy both desiderata.  
Possible response: Björnsson & Finlay’s shifting target view provides a proposition that 
Advisor can semantically assess (the target content), and a proposition is exactly the sort 
of thing one can assess via disagreement markers such as ‘What you said/think/believe is 
false’.  Contrast this with (3):   
(3) Frank: I love haggis.   
Stephen: No way! You’re wrong.  Haggis is disgusting. 
In (3) there isn’t any proposition for Stephen to assess (at least, not that Frank and 
Stephen disagree about), whereas if the shifting target view is right then in AGENT there 
is a proposition for Advisor to assess (viz. the proposition that Agent ought, relative to 
Advisor’s information, to go to well A). 
I don’t think that this helps much.  The shifting target view does provide a proposition 
that Advisor can semantically assess, and perhaps one could appeal to this in developing 
an alternative explanation why Advisor’s use of the required disagreement markers is 
felicitous.  But that alternative explanation would have nothing to do with the way in 
which Björnsson & Finlay satisfy LOCATE DISAGREEMENT.  Again: Incompatibility in 
non-doxastic attitude doesn’t license the use of the full range of disagreement markers.  
Consequently, Björnsson & Finlay’s way of satisfying LOCATE DISAGREEMENT fails to 
satisfy RESPECT THE DATA.   Perhaps there’s some other way of satisfying LOCATE 
DISAGREEMENT that can satisfy RESPECT THE DATA, and perhaps that way makes use of 
the observation that in AGENT there is a proposition for Advisor to assess.  But the 
appeal to incompatibility in non-doxastic attitude doesn’t help here.  
4. The moral 
Björnsson & Finlay suggest that their strategy will work for other plausibly context-
sensitive expressions that face analogous problems (p. 36).  I suspect that it won’t.  I’ll 
focus on a small range of such expressions, ‘tasty’, ‘funny’, ‘beautiful’, ‘might’ and 
‘knows’.   
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Torfinn Huvenes (2012) has suggested a way in which the contextualist about ‘tasty’ 
claims can deal with the semantic assessment problem.  Consider:  
(6) Alec: Haggis is tasty. 
Torfinn: Yuck! Haggis is not tasty. 
It’s plausible that ‘tasty’ claims pragmatically express non-doxastic attitudes, the idea 
being that Alec’s ‘tasty’ claim pragmatically expresses a pro-attitude towards haggis 
whereas Torfinn’s pragmatically expresses a con-attitude towards haggis.  Again, this is a 
sort of incompatibility in non-doxastic attitude, and this is a sort of quasi-expressivism.  
But consider: 
(7) Torfinn: What you said/think/believe is false.  Haggis is not tasty. 
Unlike his rejoinder in (6), Torfinn’s rejoinder in (7) doesn’t strike me as particularly 
natural.  This suggests that one can’t felicitously express disagreement about ‘tasty’ claims 
using these sorts of disagreement markers.  Consequently, an appeal to incompatibility in 
non-doxastic attitude will suffice to deal with the semantic assessment problem for the 
contextualist about ‘tasty’ claims.5 
This suggests that Björnsson & Finlay’s strategy will only work for certain expressions, 
viz. about which one can only express disagreement using a limited range of 
disagreement markers (‘No’, ‘You’re wrong).  So the strategy will work for ‘tasty’ and 
perhaps ‘funny’, but not for ‘might’, ‘knows’ and perhaps ‘beautiful’.  The moral is that, 
while an appeal to incompatibility in non-doxastic attitude will deal with the semantic 
assessment problem for the contextualist about certain expressions (‘tasty’, ‘funny’), it 
won’t deal with the problem for the contextualist about other expressions (‘ought’, 
‘might’, ‘knows’).6 
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